



SOMEDAY MALAYSIA

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SOMEDAY MALAYSIA

by . . . EDUARDO L. MARTELINO

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
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Perpustakaan Negeri

SOMEDAY MALAYSIA is a summation of conditions in a section of the globe that is the battleground of an ideological warfare the like of which has never been seen in recorded history. It is how these nations may decide to cast their lot that may tilt the balance of power in favor of one side as against the other. To be not only cognizant of but conversant with their ideals and aspirations is important for the American people. To the extent that it will help in attaining such an end, SOMEDAY MALAYSIA is a valuable contribution for which the author deserves both commendation and congratulation.

by GENERAL CARLOS P. ROMULO
*President of the Fourth
General Assembly of the
United Nations*

Washington, D.C.
June 30, 1959



FOREWORD

THOUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA RECEIVES LITTLE ATTENTION IN world politics today, it remains one of the globe's most critically tender areas. Through the last century, these far-flung areas have become a mélange of exploited humanity through the shouldering growth of imperial powers. They have achieved a freedom and independence in name only, having cast off one yoke to become enslaved in another; they are still imprisoned by poverty, pestilence and the ravages of wars. They remain an open sore ready for the pseudo-healing processes of any type of "isms" that may be paraded under the cloak of "nationalism." This "jip service independence" of a people ill prepared to receive it is certainly prone to the imprint of communism which has become a tenacious dogma in other sectors of the world.


And so the establishment of a true leadership in a free Southeast Asia becomes one of the paramount responsibilities of our time. In this potpourri, one nation stands head and shoulders above the multitudes—the Philippines. The Philippine Government, blossoming under the "benevolency" of the United States, assumed the mantle of independence gracefully. I feel that this is the nation, therefore, that will gradually assume the role of leadership in this area. The West is fortunate, indeed, to have an ally who is experienced in the democratic process and who offers such irrefutable testimony of the blessings of the democratic way of life to other Southeast Asian populations.

Mr. Martellino gives us a primer of Southeast Asia through his intense, heartfelt narration, that is both discerning and illuminating. We as Americans, and as important

contributors in Western culture, must take heed: for if we do not, and turn an anesthetized cheek to the basic philosophies and mores of Southeast Asian culture, we will be the antithesis of the little Dutch boy who plugged the dyke in time; we will let the "waters" of communism overflow unchecked.

We have long heard the adage "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet"; but not only has the twain met, it is in full bloom as a sincere way of life in the Philippine community. While others of the family of Southeast Asian nations struggle for identity, the Philippines has already assumed its role in pioneering this ideology throughout this critical area.

My hope and my utmost confidence lie with the mission of the Philippine people: that they will meet the need for leadership, and will continue to assume the role for which they are so ably fitted—to carry ever forward, the mantle of democracy.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Lester L. Wolff". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The first name "Lester" is written in a large, bold script, followed by "L." and "Wolff" in a slightly smaller but consistent cursive hand. The signature ends with a sharp, upward-pointing flourish.

LESTER L. WOLFF

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
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PART ONE:

The Author Presents His Case

The cause of nationalism in Malaysia has already won . . . because its passion and its logic have stripped the "blindness" imposed by colonialism from the minds of thinking people all over the region. . . . The Malaysians will never again accept the "alien fable" that we are a poor and stagnant race in lands blessed with rich gifts of nature, that we are indolent and and passive. . . .

—CLARO M. RECTO



A VISION

ONCE UPON A TIME, A MAN HAD A DARING AND MOST COMPELLING vision. Clairvoyant Manuel Luis Quezon of the Philippines dreamed about a potently prosperous world unit comprising the nations of Southeast Asia inhabited by the Malayan race. He saw the countries of Burma, Thailand, Annam, Malaya, Indonesia and his own native Philippines leagued in an integrated commonwealth of Malaysia. Here was a strong, unspent, federated republic, economically self-sufficient and politically stable, holding its own among the great powers of the world.

The vision was an ambitious one, but it stemmed from the man's firm aspirations for the ethnic group to which he belonged. He stood vigorously opposed to the idea of integrating the races, and advocated instead a preservation and propagation of racial stocks. The good Lord would not have created the different races if He did not intend this to be so.

It was an untimely vision also, for at that time none of the countries in the region was self-governing. True, there had begun to spread a rising tide of nationalism. However, even this was interrupted by the Japanese plunder in the Pacific.

Fate robbed Quezon of the gratifying opportunity of witnessing the grant of independence to his native land, followed shortly thereafter by the expiry of colonialism in the Southeast Asian area. The ideas of self-determination, which started

to take root before World War II, had been realized at last.

The vision now appeared to have a chance of materializing, but was still vague at this stage. Each of the countries was engaged in rebuilding what had been destroyed by the war with Japan. Internal disorder and economic dislocation, which are natural aftergrowths of warfare, gripped the new-fledged nations of Southeast Asia. There was the concomitant period of political readjustment. Outside of independent Thailand and the American-held Philippines, the natives in the different countries had little or no active participation in the colonial governments set up by the English, the French, and the Dutch. Self-government is an art that cannot be mastered overnight. The process of learning is slow and often costly. In the international councils of the world the whole of Southeast Asia was regarded merely as a region of underdeveloped countries badly in need of charity.

It is true that there existed a highly developed culture throughout Malaysia. But western colonialism had erased all the vestiges of early Malay civilization.

Economic systems geared toward exploitation to produce principally for the world markets replaced the native economy. This could, of course, result only in arresting any development of an integrated, modern economy for the colonies. An imbalance in the native economy naturally prevailed as a consequence.

In the case, for example, of Indonesia, a "culture system" that has been described by an American author as "one of the harshest and most profitable systems of colonial exploitation ever devised" formed the very substructure of the whole economy of the country. It was a system unequaled even by the methods used in the early American slave plantations.

Western imperialism wrought equally retrogressive damage upon the social and cultural foundations of the colonies. Only a few natives were exposed to limited Western educa-

tion, and this was done only as an expedient for effective administration and management of the colonies' populations.

Independence to these former colonies of Southeast Asia has meant, therefore, a rebirth. The long and tedious process of attaining political and economic growth must take its natural course. There are no shortcuts to guarantee success and the Malaysians realize that. But they realize, too, that they are working against time—time, because already a new menace has reared its ugly head over the southeast area.

Communism from the Asiatic mainland has successfully made inroads into most of the Malayan countries. Preying on the weaknesses of the sapling republics, the Communists are seeking to subvert the foundations of the constituted authorities in these nations with the aim of gaining political control. The grand strategy directed from the Kremlin follows a set pattern of first attempting to overthrow by force the existing governmental system. Failing in this, the alternate scheme calls for infiltration of the governmental structure at all possible levels.

Communist parties were organized in the countries of Southeast Asia following the Russian Revolution. The ideology of a new democracy, which gained little headway before independence, profited greatly from the growing nationalist movements throughout the region. In most of the countries of the area, the Communist Party had in fact played a major role in the political struggle for freedom.

In the Philippines, the Communist Party had been organized as early as 1931. However, it was after independence was gained in 1945 that the aggressive designs of the Party became manifest. Armed rebellion against the government began, but was quickly suppressed by the armed forces. During the war with Japan, the Communist Party had merged itself with the local socialist movement and fought the Japanese from behind a disguised united front. The failure to

overthrow the government by force and the subsequent outlawing of Communism by the Philippine Congress compelled the Party to go underground.

In Indonesia, the P.K.I. (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*) had an earlier start. Established in 1920, the Party succeeded in penetrating into labor ranks to foment armed outbreaks as early as 1926 and 1927. The P.K.I. was outlawed in 1926, but it continued to work underground.

Internal tensions that began to beset Indonesia after her struggle for independence created once again an atmosphere for a thriving Communist Party. In 1948, three years after the establishment of the Indonesian Republic, the Communists started a revolt, but this was ultimately quelled by the republican government. During the Japanese occupation the Communists joined the ranks of Indonesian guerrillas. Today the Party is active again in affairs of state. While the Communist is not the majority party, the existing political strength in Indonesia is equally divided among the four political parties that emerged after the elections of September 1955. The Communist Party is one of them.

French colonialism in Annam, or Vietnam, made it easy for the Communist Party to take root. Communist inroads into this French protectorate in Southeast Asia were made possible through the Chinese Kuomintang, for the Annamese cultural traditions ran parallel to the Chinese for many centuries. The exploits of Nguyen Ai Quoc, alias Ho Chi Minh, are too recent to require further recounting. Vietnam is divided today and the Communists of the north have not ceased to covet the democratic republic in South Vietnam.

Then there was Burma with her rich religious tradition of Buddhism. In their desire for self-government and growing dissatisfaction with British rule, the Burmese found the Marxist doctrines interesting. The Communist Party, which also cooperated with the anti-Japanese effort, finally established itself during the war in 1943. But no sooner had Burma won

her independence than internal rebellions inspired by "White Flag" Communists began to plague the young republic. The Burmese government, under the administration of Thakin Nu, outlawed the Communist Party in March 1948, the same year that the Republic of the Union of Burma was recognized as a fully independent state. The Thakin Nu or U Nu government, however, recognized the Chinese Communist regime in 1950 despite the fact that the combating of Communism dangers within the Burmese borders continued.

Looking at the case of Thailand, we find it the only nation in Southeast Asia successful in preserving its political independence; yet this buffer state for the British and French colonial empires in the area has not been immune from the itching palm of the Communists. One of the key figures in the *coup d'état* of June 24, 1932, to do away with the monarchy, was Pridi Banomyong, an avowed Marxist. He was ousted from the government in 1933; after a brief return to power after World War II, he was forced to flee to Red China following the military coup staged by Phibun Songgram. The Thai government has outlawed any and all forms of Communist activities, but Pridi continues to attack Phibun Songgram's government with Communist China's support.

Malaya, the newest Southeast Asia republic has the difficult problem of multiracial groups that compose the country's population. The Chinese, who are the second largest group next to the Malays, have been unwilling to give up their Chinese citizenship, but want to participate in Malayan affairs. During the British rule, these Chinese immigrants in Malaya had encroached upon the economy of the country and progressively gained political power. The Chinese Communist Party openly established itself in Malaya in 1931, and in 1948 shook the country with a military uprising with the aim of establishing an independent "Malayan Peoples' Democratic Republic." By 1955, the British succeeded in weakening the Communist guerrillas although they were not completely sub-

duced. The present situation is not, therefore, beyond the likelihood of future aggressive devices from the Communists.

Has the Red storm brewing over Southeast Asia then rubbed out the "vision" for a united, common effort among the Malaysian peoples? The precariousness of the situation today can be grasped in the following significant words of the late Ramon Magsaysay of the Philippines: ". . . the colonialism that threatens Asia today is world Communism."

Have the Malayan people finally succeeded in extricating themselves from the clutches of Western colonialism only to be trapped by another interloper's noose?

The Malaysians certainly have the means to achieve collective greatness. Together they compose one fifth of the world's total population. Beneath the surfaces of their lands lie vast untapped treasures of oil, gold, copper, tin, manganese and other rich metals. The whole of Southeast Asia has been blessed with rich, productive soil. Here lie the spice gardens of the world, the most productive rubber, tobacco, coconut and hemp plantations. As early as the twelfth century, merchants from Persia, Arabia and India journeyed to this region for the profitable trade that was to be had. From the wealth of Malaysia, the declining nations of Europe built powerful empires that enabled them to virtually rule the world.

The abundance of natural wealth within Southeast Asia still cannot be properly measured. Suffice it to say that there is available today a sufficient supply of raw materials to provide for four times the present population of the entire region.

Industrial centers are gradually expanding throughout Malaysia and may someday be able to absorb the steadily increasing output of raw material.

Yes, the vision a man once had may yet burgeon into a reality: someday indeed, Malaysia.

II

ECONOMIC APPRAISAL

RECENT SURVEYS UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS and other research agencies in Southeast Asia have shown that the countries in the area still rely heavily on exports of agricultural and mineral products for economic survival. This backward characteristic in the Malaysian economic personality can be attributed to the lack of capital and technical know-how necessary to step-up industrial development. Thus it is that the economic wealth for the present lies chiefly in the rich and undeveloped natural resources.

Unfortunately, economic wealth is not solely gauged by the abundance of one's natural resources. Other contributing factors, such as those mentioned—capital and technical knowledge to harness these resources—are equally important if economic independence is to be realized. The dire lack of these developmental factors has caused widespread poverty among the masses of people. For this reason, Southeast Asia has often been aptly described as an area where there is poverty amidst plenty.

Agricultural production was geared by the colonial powers to feed the industrial factories of Europe, and the kind of raw-material output was determined by a strict, selective system based upon the exigent needs of the colonizing country. This selfish control in economic development, motivated by direct exploitation, has resulted in the present economic inadequacy in all Malaysia. Before the imperialists took over,

an economic system which was better suited to the needs of the natives was in effect. This system consisted of a proportionate combination of a subsistence agriculture, a few necessary cottage industries and limited trade. It was an economy that could not compare in volume with the huge exportations of raw materials that followed colonization. But it was a system which, if it had not been disrupted by Western colonialism, could have provided the basis for a balanced economy and the eventual attainment of national sufficiency.

Today the picture has not essentially changed. Southeast Asia continues to depend on the demands of foreign markets for her agricultural and mineral products. This places her at the mercy of other world nations whose fluctuating needs only add to the instability of the region.

The result of this preordained agricultural economic system is the almost complete reliance on foreign factories for consumer goods. The industrial growth of the region has been slow, and some claim today that lack of sufficient resources of coal and iron ore has prevented full industrial development. This reasoning is not completely valid, however, when one considers that in other parts of the world countries have become industrially successful despite a lack of these minerals. Coal and iron ore can be imported in place of certain finished goods. Then, too, the rapid advancements made in the fields of energy and matter toward harnessing the atom to supply cheap industrial power could someday mean the deliverance of Malaysian economy from that of mere primary producer.

The problem of technical skill is being solved through the many student exchange programs with other countries, through United Nations agencies, scholarships and other grants. In fact, the output of trained men and women in some fields of the sciences and arts today outweighs the employment capacities of the existing industries. In many of the countries, one can find engineers and technicians engaged in

farming or some other trade not suited to their skills simply because not enough opportunities are open to them.

And so the most grave and pressing problem continues to be the lack of available capital in the countries of the area. Southeast Asia desperately needs capital goods. Heavy machinery must be imported, and the national governments have not been able to afford such capital goods. There are no really big industrial enterprises in Malaysia. It is true some people have made fortunes, but much of this wealth has come from mercantilism.

The moneyed people have stuck either to the importing of consumer goods or the production of raw materials. Those that have amassed great profits in this fashion are reluctant to invest in any real industrial ventures because the profit potentials have not been too promising. The effect of Western influence on merchandise preferences of the people has made it difficult for locally manufactured goods to compete with imported commodities. Efforts by the governments to discourage buying of foreign products through the imposition of high import tariffs have failed to help the growth of pioneering industries, for foreign goods somehow manage to keep flowing into the black markets and they outsell local manufactures despite their excessive prices.

The main problem that must be solved to achieve the economic objective of greater self-sufficiency, however, is formation of available investment capital. Some present-day leaders in Southeast Asia have advocated foreign economic assistance as the practical solution. But while foreign aid has been considerably helpful, it also has had many drawbacks. Most of the countries are reluctant to accept economic assistance of this kind for fear that a return to economic bondage might result. Then, too, foreign aid is often available only with strings attached to the package. This was particularly true in the Philippines when, in 1950, the Bell Economic Mission

to that country recommended direct financial aid of some \$250 million. However, implementation of the Bell report by the United States was conditioned on the passage of certain political reform measures by the Philippine Legislature. This kind of pressure upon the Philippine government understandably caused a bit of resentment among some Filipinos.

An equally difficult problem lies in the case of assistance from foreign private sources. Private capital, of necessity, seeks a favorable investment climate before it will risk any capital outlay in an alien country. Nationalistic governments in the region provide very little such incentive. Strict laws on profit remittances and other severe laws levied on alien businesses have limited the amount of foreign private investment in the area.

How then can Southeast Asia attract sufficient capital to push through her economic development? Two sources of capital accumulation seem to appear within measurable distance for the present. The first and most practical one would have to come from government subsidy of all those necessary industries which cannot be undertaken by private capitalists. Through government initiative, enough investment capital could be raised from taxes, tariffs and profits from these very enterprises. This system of financing has proven successful in Burma where the government has stepped in to finance and manage the industrial development program. It is true, however, that nationalized industry tends towards a socialistic type of economic management. In Burma, socialist theories have established a strong imprint because of the Burmese affinity to socialism. But everywhere else that the system has been adopted, practical considerations have been the sole impelling motive.

The other source of internal capital formation is from private initiative on the part of local investors. A large

amount of indigenous capital is available throughout the area. But it is shy; the holders must be further encouraged and imbued with a spirit to crusade and pioneer into new fields of investment. Perhaps these groups could be persuaded to take over gradually the government monopolies. This system has been found to work well in the Philippines where the government has gone into business for itself. As soon as private industry was prepared to take over the enterprise, or if it offered any competition to the government on a specific line, the government simply closed shop and ventured into some other new field.

Still another source is to be found in the huge labor surpluses in Southeast Asia. In the agricultural areas, people are idle during the long periods between the planting and harvest seasons. All this unemployed labor could be mobilized to add to the over-all productive output. The governments could undertake to set up cottage industries in the rural centers for this purpose. This would, at the same time, increase the overall per capita productivity of labor.

It is more than doubtful that all these methods of capital accumulation can adequately meet the maximum economic requirements of Malaysia. It is difficult to make accurate estimates on what amount of development financing the region can use effectively measured against its increasing rate of economic need. What can, however, be expediently accomplished by these means will substantially shorten the distance to the final goal. For one thing, excessive dependence on foreign-exchange earnings will be greatly eased. The immoderate reliance on international export has caused nothing but economic insecurity for Malaysia.

This is not to say that Malaysia should strive to have her foreign-trade channels shut tight in favor of a policy of isolationism. History has proven often enough that no nation, how-

ever richly endowed it might be, can survive by secluding itself from the rest of the world. Formerly isolationist countries have had to abandon this futile theory.

A revision of Southeast Asia's present position of foreign-trade balance must be made with a view toward obtaining maximum gains from export earnings. The main defect of the export trade lies in limited specialization in three or four products for which demand in the world markets has suffered acute decreases. Consumers of rubber and tin, for example (Southeast Asia accounts for 95 per cent of the world's raw rubber production and 72 per cent of the tin supply), have long since ceased to depend on the area for these products with the discovery of synthetics and other substitutes by modern science. There was a time when the free world market was capable of absorbing all of the region's output of rubber, tin, rice, sugar, copra and hemp. Today, rice surpluses in Burma and Thailand have compelled these countries to look to the Communist bloc for trade expansion.

Perhaps the establishment of trade relations with neighboring Communist countries can provide the solution for liquidating these unmarketable surpluses. As the economic pressures mount, it would seem that Malaysia could be left with no other alternative. But just as the nationalist governments have feared economic slavery from the West, so, too, will they have reason for equally strong apprehensions in dealing with the Communists.

A more favorable answer to this problem is to be found in diversification of the exportable products. A redirection in the production of raw materials, based on stable demands of the international markets, should be made. As an instance, there is the growing market for chromite, bauxite, manganese and other base metals which abound in the area. In the group of surplus commodities, restriction in overproduction and more effort on improving quality and grade of the products

would establish a limited but permanent demand for them in the world markets.

Also, the facilities for the marketing and distribution of these exports have to be expanded. By the very geography of the area, it is only natural that shipping systems should form one of the main segments of the entire economic development scheme. Sadly enough, the transporting of goods is today largely handled by foreign carriers, and the Southeast Asian countries are losing a major source of revenue here. The building of ships and establishment of a large merchant marine fleet is one of the industries which could be immediately subsidized by the governments.

And so in summing up this appraisal of Malaysia's economic potential, it is indeed possible to draw a hopeful conclusion, without, of course, underestimating the besetting obstacles. The vital resources that make for full economic development are there. Furthermore, Malaysians have proven themselves capable of vigorous and sustained activity. Living standards are low, but the people do not suffer the same acute poverty and misery that characterize the lot of the masses of such areas as India and the Middle East.

Finally, each of the countries already has a working base in the most important development factors—communications, transportation and industrial plants—which await only improvement and expansion.

MALAYSIAN POWER VACUUM

SUDDEN WITHDRAWAL BY THE WESTERN COLONIAL POWERS from Southeast Asia automatically transformed this heretofore obscure region into a power vacuum, and consequently placed the very security of the new nations in a rather precarious state. The importance and significance of this vacuum may be ascribed to the geographic positions of existing neighbor-powers whose natural tendencies for expansion incline towards vernal Malaysia.

From the north looms the new China, an energized giant girding its loins under the disciplined guidance of its begetter—Soviet dictatorship—while to the west lies a resurgent India whose millions of potential emigrants have looked to the lands of Southeast Asia. India may not be regarded by some as a world power today, but she is decidedly the key republic of the Indian Ocean area. And last, but not least, to the northeast, an overpopulated Japan eyes Malaysia with the same sharp appetite that caused her to sick her *Bushido* warriors on the unsuspecting Malaysians in 1941.

But however ominous this picture may seem at first glance, the danger of external penetration from any of these powers just mentioned is not thus far immediate. For the present, none of them is prepared to undertake or risk a campaign of aggressive expansion. China is busy building and consolidating her potential resources, as is also India. And Japan is still recovering from the setbacks her industries suf-

ferred during the last war. It is a situation resulting, therefore, in a convenient advantage to the Malaysians, who can now seize this opportunity to fashion and strengthen their own security.

There is still another factor that has contributed to Southeast Asia's auspicious position on the stage of international politics. In the present realignment of political forces throughout the world into two major camps, an uneasy balance of power has been established. The strategists in the existing cold war between communism and the West concede that Southeast Asia could very easily tip this balance of power to either bloc by joining one or the other, or falling into the hands of one or the other. So long as the present political deployment of world forces can maintain the *status quo*, the Malaysian vacuum will remain a vacuum to the advantage of Malaysians.

The question now arises: Is Malaysia defensible? A perfunctory examination is bound to evoke a gloomy answer. In the first place, Southeast Asia lacks the military power to ward off a determined external invasion from any of the covetous nations about her. Communist China presumably poses the most serious threat in the foreseeable future. Annam, Malaya and Burma, constituting, as they do, part of the China littoral could be readily engulfed in the first wave of attack. The rest would be straight sailing for the invader, for Sumatra is but a jump away from Malaya, thence Java, Celebes, Borneo and the Philippines.

On the other hand, a circumspect scrutiny of another aspect of the problem might present a more optimistic estimate. Singly, the Southeast Asian countries are weak and virtually defenseless against external aggression. Japan's successes in the last war have proven this, albeit the countries may have been less than adequately prepared and were caught unaware at the time. But a united Malaysia pooling its

strength and power could certainly offer an aggressor a more effective resistance. The memory of blockaded England during World War II with her defiant and magnificent resistance against the Nazi threat of physical invasion is a perfect example of what unity and determined tenacity can accomplish.

For the present, the Malaysian countries have elected two distinct formulae in the establishment of their defense structures. One pattern, which the Philippines and Thailand have adopted, consists of alliance with the Western powers and direct defiance of the Communist bloc. Both nations are members of a collective security system, and the Philippines have entered into a bilateral defense agreement with the United States as well. All the other countries have chosen to tread the narrow path of neutralism in the hope that this middle-of-the-road policy will obviate any antagonism from either side.

As the matter stands, it is indeed fortunate that the occasion has not yet presented itself to prove which of the two security methods is the right or the wrong one. Should such an event occur, the erring republics would surely totter to their fall and suffer such destruction that they might never again recover.

Here again one can appreciate the desirability and added advantages of a confederated Malaysian state. A re-evaluation of its security position in relation to the powers of the world, and the adoption of a single, steadfast policy in international affairs, whether it be the right one or the wrong one, would decidedly afford a unified Malaysia a better chance for survival. Divided, her future is forfeit.

IV

THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL DIVERSITIES

ONE OF THE BASIC ARGUMENTS PUT FORTH AS A FACTOR hindering the unification of Malaysia is the complex diversity to be found in social, cultural and religious practices of the region. There is a certain degree of validity to this concept, for it cannot be denied that foreign social impacts on individual Southeast Asian countries have brought varied dictums together to form what may well be described as a gallery of divers cultures.

The earliest social force of significance to penetrate the area came from India and the impact of this influence dominated the social life of Malaysians for over a thousand years. It was so strong an impact that a large segment of the Malaysian peoples to this day adhere to Mohammedanism and Hinduism, the two religious cultures which the Indians introduced. Of these two, Islam has been the more preponderant. It is the ranking faith today of Indonesia, Thailand and some of the southern islands of the Philippines.

In the other countries of the Indochina peninsula, however, it was the cultural influence of China that became more widely felt. Buddhism and Taoism have left their indelible imprints in most of Burma, Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Malaya. In fact, this spiritual heritage played an important role in the moulding of nationalism in these countries, and it has always been integrated with government itself.

Add to these the wide sphere of Western political, cultural

and economic influences, and the picture of multicultural assortment is complete. Western social impacts were in themselves heterogeneous, for the term "West" has always been used in a rather broad sense. The countries of Europe that wielded power in Southeast Asia were marked with their own cultural divergencies, as was the United States. Moreover, the motivating factor in their colonization of the region as viewed from an ideological standpoint also differed. Spain looked upon her colonies as instrumentalities for spreading her culture as well as for the promotion of her political power. The attitude of the French toward Indochina was similar to the Spanish view, but the Dutch were primarily concerned with trade and selfish economic considerations, so their cultural impact upon Indonesia was practically nil.

Another deterring factor toward unification is the lingual diversity among the peoples of Malaysia. There are at least 400 different languages and dialects spoken throughout the region. Linguistic experts have succeeded in linking these languages together through some basic words and phrases. Unfortunately, the similarities are insufficient as a basis for communication. An illustration of this fact are the Philippine basic languages, which number 78. Proficiency in only one of these languages does not necessarily mean understanding of the others. Because of this, the Filipinos have adopted English as their unifying language, since it is spoken throughout the nation as a result of the fifty years' occupation by the United States. English is the medium in use in all phases of government as well as social activities in the Philippines today. Officially, the Filipinos have designated Tagalog to be the national language, but until it can implant itself more firmly, it will have to continue playing second fiddle to English.

With Malaysia culturally divided, it becomes fundamentally important now to seek a unifying bond that will tie the region together if the dream for a greater Malaysia is to

materialize. Fortunately, common bonds do exist. For one thing, penetration by Western cultures has awakened the peoples to the realization that they are possessors of a culture that is distinctly their own. They have become aware of their own identity as a race, and it is precisely this consciousness that has given the stimulation to nationalistic aspirations.

Also, the recent political developments on the international scene have gradually drawn the Southeast Asians closer together in anticipation of possible external action against them by a more powerful and aggressive nation. The problem of security will undoubtedly be a strong factor towards unification.

But stronger than any other bonds are the racial, historic and geographic ties among the Malaysian countries. Philippine Senator Lorenzo M. Sumulong has best described these factors of kinship in the following words addressed to his countrymen:

... we should be reminded, that our ancestors were enterprising Malaysians who centuries ago came, wave after wave, to live and settle in this country of ours.

Our people must take into account not only their Malay origin. Our people must be told, lest they forget, who are the other Malayan peoples to whom they are bound by ties of racial kinship and common historical roots. We in the Philippines must know and must bear in mind that our fellow Malays are the peoples in Malaya, Java, Sumatra, Burma and Thailand. We must further know and bear in mind that Indonesia, although not integrally Malay because of the divers nationalities composing its population, is preponderantly Malay. Again we must bear in mind that we are a part of Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, and even if the peoples in all of these

regions are not all integrally or preponderantly Malay, still they are fellow Asians with whom we are inextricably related by reason of ethnic, cultural and geographic ties.

Time and patience will be required to develop closer cultural and economic ties between us and our neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. Like ourselves, many of our fellow Malays have been bound for long periods of time, and some are still bound by closer cultural and economic ties with their former or present colonial rulers. But they are as aware as we are, if not more so, of the racial, historic and geographic ties that bind us all. They, too, would welcome closer cultural and economic relations with us. I think that there is a common will and desire to hurdle the barriers and overcome the obstacles standing in the way of closer cultural and economic relations amongst them, and, as the saying goes, where there is a will, there is a way.

V

THE SHAPE OF EVENTS

A SEQUENCE OF HISTORIC EVENTS HAS TRANSPIRED IN MALAYSIA over the past seventeen or so years; these events are necessary antecedents to a bright prospect for the Malaysian dream. It may have started with the early Pan-Malayan movement that was organized shortly before World War II and reflected the libertarian struggles of Southeast Asian peoples. Or perhaps the chain of events goes further back to the early revolutionary attempts for freedom, particularly those of Filipinos against Spain in the mid-sixteenth century. The slaying of Magellan on Mactan Island by Lapu-Lapu and, later, efforts towards stirring political consciousness among the people by such heroes as Dr. Jose Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, Apolinario Mabini and others may well have marked these men as the major prophets of a unified Malaysia.

But the first concrete step toward collective effort by Southeast Asians was taken in July of 1949 when the late Philippine President, Elpidio Quirino, called the Baguio Conference to propose his idea for a Pacific Union. A month after these exploratory talks, Quirino summoned home his Ambassador to the United Nations, Carlos P. Romulo, to begin organization work on the Pacific Ocean Conferences. It is pertinent to cite here a few excerpts from Quirino's letter to Romulo on the subject, for the thoughts Quirino expressed echo a consistent yearning for the fulfillment of the Malaysian dream. He wrote:

I conceived in the Baguio conversations last month the necessity of accelerating the process of establishing a Union predicated upon the independence and sovereignty of peoples of Southeast Asia and the countries bordering the Pacific so that, masters of their own destiny, they can concentrate their attention to their coordinated full development in order to ensure their stability and security, and thus contribute to world peace and advancement.

. . . it would be a real union on the basis of common counsel and assistance for the preservation of peace, democracy and freedom in Asia.

It can thus be seen that there is a sense of historic continuity as well as of contemporary urgency in our vigorous attack upon this problem.

I am fully aware that in summoning you to undertake this task, I have for the moment taken you away from equally important work in the United Nations. But this is part and parcel of the great overall objective of the United Nations itself, and your reward will be not only the knowledge that you have performed a duty properly devolving upon you as our Ambassador to the United Nations, but the consciousness that you have rendered service of incalculable value to the maintenance of the security and freedom of Asia in furtherance of the peace of the world.

Ten months after Romulo received his instructions from Quirino, the first plenary session of the Pacific Conference was held in Baguio City on May 26, 1950. To use Romulo's own words in describing the difficulties encountered during the preparation: "It has not been an easy task to bring the participating nations in Baguio City at this particular time. The implementation of the President's decision to convene the conference required ten months of intensive work. The whole

world is convulsed by profound and revolutionary changes. Nowhere have these changes taken place at such a rapid pace and over such an extensive area as in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. The agitation and upheavals caused by these changes enhanced the urgency and importance, but at the same time increased the difficulty of our work. We had to temper our zeal with patience."

The Baguio Conference was attended by Indonesia, Thailand, Ceylon, Pakistan, India, Australia and the Philippines, whose delegates met for four days and discussed regional cooperation in the political, economic, social and cultural fields. The Quirino bid for a union was apparently premature. Many of the countries in the region were still beset by other problems which were more pressing at the time. But this fact did not arrest subsequent developments in Southeast Asia that seemed to signal a pattern; progressive movements were slowly but surely drawing towards the ultimate goal of a united Malaysia. Shortly after Quirino's attempt for a Pacific Union, Indonesia's Chief of State, President Sukarno, was a visitor in Manila. The Filipinos were easily captivated by their distinguished guest from the south, for they had long heard of his bold and dynamic leadership during the Indonesian peoples' struggles for emancipation from Dutch rule. The Sukarno state visit was reciprocated afterward by a trip which Quirino took to Indonesia. This exchange of visits contributed greatly to better understanding and a forging of closer ties of friendship between the two Malaysian republics.

Another significant event in the history of the Malaysian peoples was the Bandung Conference of April 1955. Conceived and promoted by Indonesia and India, this conference which combined African and Asian nations was actually born out of disapproval of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and its objectives of collective security. SEATO membership did not really reflect the feelings of the people in the region

from whence it dared to derive its name. For only three Southeast Asian countries had joined the treaty. The rest, which comprised the majority of members, were the fact Western powers. The Bandung Conference, on the other hand, was more closely related to Quirino's Pacific Union in that both sought to pool the efforts of all the member countries for advancement of political, cultural and economic welfare. There was no talk of a military alliance nor any indication that the countries were against anybody.

The Bandung meeting, however, concerned itself more with discussions on regional politics and ended with affirming the right of the nations to decide their own foreign policies with respect to alliances with the West or the adoption of the neutralist position of coexistence.

Since the Bandung Conference, no attempt to formally convene the Southeast Asian nations for the purpose of pursuing the regional collaboration philosophy was ever made again. I appeared almost as though all of them had retired to the seclusion of their own shells and dismissed all hopes of renewing their efforts. This, of course, only appeared to be so. Realizing perhaps the prematurity of such an endeavor, the Malaysians possibly deferred further action and decided instead to let the natural course of events select a more opportune moment.

But this did not mean, however, that Southeast Asia had gone into a stagnant slumber in the meantime. The states had merely turned their efforts toward the strengthening of their individual political and economic structures. Ties were not severed, rather they were expanded and made more enduring through cultural exchange programs among the countries. Technicians and students were sent from one country to another to learn the ways of their neighbors. Civic and business sectors joined the government ventures along these lines knowing full well that they were slowly helping to shape a

course that would one day bring reality to a dream. The Southeast Asia Art Conference was one such project sponsored by a non-government entity, as was "Operations Brotherhood" to Viet Nam; and there were others.

Then a most promising development took place. The recent visit of Malayan Premier Tengku Abdul Rahman to Manila suddenly stirred the world from its imperturbable passiveness as regards Southeast Asia's own dreams of a truly Malaysian regional organization. The decision by both Malaya and the Philippines to start paying closer attention to their neighbors in the region was tantamount to an announcement of a revision in their respective foreign policies, particularly with respect to the Western bloc. This was followed shortly thereafter by an announcement by Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia to the effect that he was contemplating a visit to Viet Nam.

Indeed, events are shaping a clear course which may at last find Malaysia united sooner than one might think. As Premier Tengku said in Manila: "If we could get together with a firm understanding that nations must be interdependent for the good of their countries and peoples—with this purpose between us, we might well set in motion something which might be the beginning of a linking between nations within our ethnological and geographical group, naturally together in the same area, that could lead to economic and political stability for all countries in this region of Southeast Asia."



PART TWO:

Some Thoughts From Contemporary Malaysian Thinkers

A seed is being planted, and whether or not we shall be here in the season of its flowering is not important. What is important is that the tree will provide shade and shelter for those that will come after us.

—Quirino



VI

THE POSTULATES OF PANTAJASILA

by *Dr. Soebardjo of Indonesia*

(The following is a speech delivered by Indonesia's first Foreign Minister before delegates to the Baguio Conference on the Pacific Union on May 26, 1950.)

MY GOVERNMENT HAS ACCEPTED THE INVITATION TO ATTEND the conference in the belief that an international gathering of this nature would provide a suitable opportunity to assist in the realization, through practical means, of the ideals of world peace and national freedom insofar as they concern this part of the globe. For since modern science and technique have reduced the world to a single organizational unit, the problem of world peace has become one and indivisible. The smallest incident in the remotest corner of the world may have the greatest consequences and repercussions affecting all parts of the globe. Aware of the threatening dangers which apparently insignificant incidents may give rise to, to the extent of developing into a world conflagration, Indonesia is thus taking part in this conference. For we hope, through common counsel, through common efforts aiming at the realization of constructive plans in furtherance of the common welfare, through the continuous exchange of information in the matter of history, science and social developments, we can arrive at a proper understanding

of each other's needs and requirements, as well as a solution of each other's problems. And in all this we must be guided by the principle that no difficulty, however great, is incapable of being solved if approached in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual goodwill.

The sense of community and interdependence that actuates us is not only the result of our common interests in this part of the world: it is the necessary concomitant of the historical role that we, former colonial territories, have played as the sources of essential raw materials for the industrialized countries of the West. It has been a monstrous system, buttressed up by cruel but efficacious measures in the political, economic and social spheres which, in their totality, constituted the system of colonialism and imperialism such as we have known during the last three or four centuries. It has been the inevitable result of the historical expansion of the Western nations in this part of the world. Systems may differ in the various colonial areas, as the national characteristics of the various colonizing powers differ, but in essence it has been the same everywhere. Its main and dominating principle has always been the exploitation of the colonial riches, not to the benefit of the native populations, but solely for the enrichment of the individual colonial powers.

Various circumstances—the upsurge of the national independence movements in the various colonies and dependencies, the change in the world situation brought about by the last World War, which, as we are told, was fought on the issue of freedom and democracy—brought about national liberation, one after the other and with but few exceptions, of the colonial peoples of Southeast Asia. In the light of the past experiences of the now emancipated peoples and within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, it is now necessary to find a basis for common action and mutual co-operation in a specifically regional sense. This basis is logic-

ally determined by the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist character of our struggle for complete emancipation from all forms of foreign domination. When therefore we sovereign and independent nations now aim at uprooting all vestiges, in whatever form, of the old colonialism and imperialism in the countries of Southeast Asia, then this is but the natural consequence of the ideals which have actuated us in our struggle to make real the right of national self-determination, a right which is recognized by the whole of the civilized world.

Our slogan is to uproot all the remaining traces of the old, die-hard colonialism, traces of which at every step hinder the free development of the new nations.

Let us not be misunderstood. We are anti-colonial and anti-imperialist: we are not anti-Western. Individual Westerners are welcome and are free to remain in their former colonial territories to carry out peacefully and in accordance with the law their avocations. But we will have none of the colonial mentality and the attitude of superiority which in the past have poisoned relations between the Orientals and Occidentals.

Western expansion has brought in its train Western culture, Western forms of civilization, Western conceptions of government and administration, all of which are characterized by a certain rational efficiency. The various colonial powers have put their own national stamps on the political, economic and social developments of the countries which they have colonized. But they all have one thing in common: they all established a system which can be traced to the same source of culture and civilization, namely, the Graeco-Roman, which is based fundamentally on reason, impersonal right and on individualism.

We Orientals have a civilization based on entirely different tenets. Throughout the whole of Asia, including the

Middle East and the scattered islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, society—although widely divergent in its various stages of social and political development—is characterized by one dominant trait, to wit, a profound religiosity, respect for tradition and custom, and an inborn sense of community. Authority is not based on objective right as an impersonal justice, but on personal eminence and moral tradition. Society is not individualistic but collectivistic, being governed by customary law and not by individual rights.

In this background, it is clear that we cannot be otherwise than ourselves. However much circumstances may force us to absorb from the West, whatever the essential elements we must take over from occidental civilization, if we are to survive as modern nations, we must all maintain our own separate national existence. For only by developing our own national personalities can we contribute effectively to the development of a world civilization.

The postulates of the "Pantjasila" constitute the firm base on which our national policy is founded and, standing foursquare by these principles, Indonesia will keep clear of all entangling alliances—whether of a political or a military nature—directed against third parties.

We therefore deem it our duty to strive for a harmonization of conflicting interests, to work towards a reconciliation of opposing camps, and to create a new international atmosphere conducive to global peace. It is manifest that the nations of the West have somehow failed to extricate themselves from the morass of fear and hatred and belligerence that so poison international relations today. It is now the compelling duty of the free nations of Asia to set their hands to the challenging task of creating conditions that will ultimately lead to a dissipation of tensions and to the restoration of world peace and sanity. We of Indonesia take inspiration from the noble ideals of the United Nations Organization

and it will be our ceaseless endeavour, within the limits of our humble capacity, to work in concert with other peoples similarly minded to start in motion a chain of events that will save this and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

The last few decades have brought about great changes in this continent of ours. Of no small moment is the new bias in Asian economy brought about by changing world conditions. The past century saw the rich and varied produce of this continent flow in a continuous stream to the mills and factories of Europe, there to be fashioned into articles which pumped enriching blood into the body economic of the manufacturing nations. Today, with the passage of time, this lopsided economic setup has changed for the better with the far-reaching industrial programmes initiated by the countries of Asia. This basic and cardinal fact must constantly be kept in mind in order that we explore all possibilities to see how far we can bring about economic coordination among the nations of Southeast Asia.

In a sense all of us are young countries, while a good many of us are rising phoenixlike out of the ashes of a bitter past. No easy road lies ahead of us, nor can we devise some panacea overnight to solve the economic and political ills we have inherited from the yesteryears of colonial domination and exploitation. Even the very fact of sitting together, free and unfettered, around a conference table is a novel experience, for, in spite of geographical propinquity, we are verily strangers to each other. The need of the hour is a thorough understanding of our common problems, a greater appreciation of our enormous potentialities.

We are assembled here today to pool our views and to scan our regional future. So much lies at stake that the Delegation which I have the honour to speak for must define its position without the slightest equivocation. History and

geography combined have given us our national philosophy which we term the "Pantjasila"—belief in Divine Omnipotence, in humanity, in nationalism, in democracy and in social justice—which constitutes the straight and inflexible course along which our national development will be channelled. Our constitution has been built on these principles and they cut the pattern and set the pace for our national conduct.

It will now be clear that, influenced by this spiritual outlook as the motivating force in our domestic and international relations, we do not desire to find ourselves entangled in any undertaking that violates our sense of life-harmony. This conception of harmony is as old as Indonesia itself. We take pride in the fact that this harmonizing element in our national character has made us a tolerant people, as can be proved by our attitude towards the various religions that have, at different times, come to our shores. While elsewhere nations have engaged themselves in fratricidal strife to implant or eradicate some particular religion, we in Indonesia have welcomed and nurtured religions so diverse and antipodal as Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the greater part of humanity was engaged in a gigantic blood bath to prove the superiority of some particular religious faith over another. Today these religions exist side by side in a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance. We believe, therefore, that the political ideologies that sunder world unity today will, given understanding and good faith, learn to co-exist. Our national motto is "Unity in Diversity." We believe that this selfsame motto can provide the key to world peace and understanding.

Consider again Indonesia's geopolitical position. We sit astride the crossroads of Southeast Asia and form a common meeting ground for the differing (and perhaps conflicting) interests that encompass us. It is to our interest and that of

our neighbors that we refuse to take sides with this or that nation or group of nations, that we keep open our political, economic and cultural traffic lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans that cut across Indonesia.

Unafraid and unashamedly we stand for peace on earth, goodwill unto men, whatever their religious or political faiths. We want to assert ourselves as a harmonizing factor in a world torn by differences; we want to see the One World civilized man has envisaged throughout the centuries. In the words of the distinguished Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines: "Let us try to reach the impossible by finding the ways of possibility."

VII

THE THAI IDEA OF FREEDOM

by *H. R. H. Prince Wan Waithayakorn*

THE QUESTION HAS OFTEN BEEN ASKED, AND IS STILL BEING asked, whether free democracy can work in Asia because it is distinctly a Western concept and development. Very serious doubt about this has been raised and is being raised. Hope in this respect, however, has been expressed for the Philippines, thanks to American guidance and example. But what about Thailand? Here I submit that in Thailand, too, free democracy has a very real chance of permanent success. It is true that the democratic regime in this country has been established and developed by the Thai people themselves without the direct guidance of a foreign democratic power, but the Thai leaders, of course, have been and continue to be influenced by Western concepts of free democracy. On the other hand, it may well be that because the Thai people have been working out their own democratic regime themselves, such a regime will have a good chance of success. At any rate, those of you who have heard me talk before should remember how adaptable the Thai people are to a Western way of life.

I shall endeavor to show you how receptive the Thai people are to the Western idea of freedom.

I suppose I can take President Roosevelt's formulation of the Four Freedoms as a comprehensive statement of the

Western concept of freedom. I shall leave aside the freedom from fear and the freedom from want.

For the freedom from fear I would just reaffirm our earnest support of the United Nations and our faith in that world organization as well as our determined policy of close cooperation with the United States and other free countries in defending ourselves against the danger of aggression.

As regards the freedom from want, the Thai people are grateful for the bounty of nature, but plenty is a relative term, and through contact with the modern world the needs of both the Thai nation and the Thai people grow from day to day. The government of Thailand, therefore, has to pursue a more and more active policy in developing the natural resources of this country and in providing greater welfare, facilities and assistance. Nevertheless, it can, fortunately, still be said that the freedom from want is not yet an acute problem in this country.

The freedom of conscience need not detain us long. Buddhism, which is the religion of the vast majority of the Thai people, has been well known throughout the centuries for its tolerance.

Turpin, in his *History of Siam*, has this to say on tolerance: "Although superstition has corrupted all their minds, they tolerate every religious cult. Their respect for the traditions of their ancestors does not inspire in them any aversion to alien ceremonies. This stubborn attachment to error makes them believe that they have superiority over the other nations that do not think like themselves, but only pity those who have the misfortune of being deprived of the light which shines for them; difference of opinion never engenders hatred, and ambition is not at all covered by the veil of religion in order to light the torch of civil discords. A French traveller, who had long studied their character, remained convinced that they were all born philosophers."

Whatever truth there may be in this last assertion, the fact remains that there is complete tolerance in this country. The kings of Thailand have even granted lands to missionaries for the building of their churches, schools and hospitals.

Buddhism, in fact, is a religion which upholds the dignity of man and promotes human rights and freedom. It teaches an universal Law of Karma or action, which is applicable to all human beings. The Law of Karma is simply stated thus: "Do good and you will get good; do evil and you will get evil. When a person is born, he or she starts with the Karma or Deed from past life." The Karma is improved by good deeds and is worsened by evil deeds. Thus you must help yourself by doing good. As, in action, there is an exercise of the will, man is not bound by predetermined fate but by Karma, which he can modify by his deeds. He is, therefore, free to work out his own destiny on the basis of his past Karma. Herein lie the dignity and freedom of man.

Buddhism is also a religion of humanity and the brotherhood of man. As Christianity is a religion of love: "Love thy neighbor as thyself," so Buddhism is a religion of compassion: "As a mother at the risk of her life watches over her own child, her only child, so also let everyone cultivate a boundless friendly mind toward all beings."

Having given you the above background, I can now deal with the remaining freedom, namely, the freedom of expression, for it is not sufficient for you to be able to believe what you think and feel is right, but you must be able to express whatever you think and feel is right as well. This is the crucial but difficult and delicate test of individual freedom as against the claims of public authority.

Such individual liberty has been growing for centuries in the West, and in the United States it has reached a very high peak; it is a very live force in the way of life of the American people because it was not just granted to them but they won

it and had to fight for it, and they fought for it on the right principle of no taxation without representation. Thus representative government has been very fully developed in the United States; and with representative government, authority and liberty meet on the common ground of responsibility; no power is exercised without responsibility nor is any freedom exercised without responsibility. In a country, however, where the democratic regime is newly established, it is only natural that the talk one hears is usually that too much power is being exercised and not enough freedom; there is little talk of responsibility on either side, and yet responsibility is the crucial element to look out for.

The democratic regime will succeed permanently in a country only if the check of responsibility can be seen in the traditional regime of government, and also the restraint of responsibility in the exercise of freedom by the people.

I will now proceed to put this test to the various stages in the political development of Thailand.

First there was the period of Sukhothai, which means the Dawn of Happiness. That was the first Thai kingdom in this country. Let me read a few lines of the stone inscriptions of Sukhothai to you.

After describing the prosperity and freedom of trade of Sukhothai, the inscriptions say: "At the gateway there is a bell hung up. If any one of the public has a complaint or grievance of body or of mind to place before the King, he has only to sound the bell that is hung up. King Ram Kamhaeng, on hearing it, will call him up for an upright investigation.

"The people in this city of Sukhothai are, therefore, glad to cultivate plantations of areca nut and betel everywhere in the city. Coconut plantations abound in this city. Jack-fruit plantations abound in this city. Tamarind trees also abound in this city. Whoever cultivates them owns them. . . .

"The people in this city of Sukhothai are charitable, pious and devoted to almsgiving. King Ram Kamaeng, the ruler of Sukhothai, as well as princes and princesses, gentlemen and ladies of the nobility and men and women all have faith in the Buddhist religion. . . ."

You can see that it was a real age of freedom, freedom based on justice and religious faith. Only it could not last because the regime was suited to city states rather than to countries.

In the Ayudhyan period, that is to say from the middle of the fourteenth century, the regime was one of absolute monarchy on the Cambodian model, but the divine right of kings was not accepted in this country. It is true that we use the word Omkar, Divine Utterance, for Royal Command, but in the King's style and title given to him at his coronation there is a phrase in Pali which means "elected by the people in assembly." The King solemnly promises to rule with righteousness and justice. He has to observe the ten Buddhist kingly duties: liberality, piety, charity, freedom from wrath, mercy, patience, rectitude, mildness, devotion, and freedom from enmity.

It will be noticed that the emphasis is on the duty side of government and not on that of power.

Of course, when the traditional check on absolute monarchy was not observed, there was trouble, as indicated by the Thai Prime Minister to Townsend Harris, the American Envoy in 1856, who writes in his Journal: "On being asked if there were often changes in the dynasty, he uttered the real republican sentiment that kings who claim their title by right of birth, often forget they originated from the people, consider themselves as superior beings and don't lend an ear to the sufferings of their subjects—so there was often a change at the fourth generation of princes of the same dynasty."

But, normally, the king would have the welfare of his

people at heart. The Thammasat or Book of Fundamental Law describes the act of judgment by the king in this way: "He listens intently to the case justly tried by the judges; and with this as a magnifying glass and with the Book of Fundamental Laws as his eyes, he duly looks at the prevailing condition of the country. Then, with his presence of mind as his right hand, he takes the sword of reason and cuts the knot of all cases of the people justly."

The Thammasat itself constituted a check on the king. It makes a distinction between Thammasat or Fundamental Law, or in the language of the West, the Law of Nature, and Rachasat, the Royal Law. Every command of the absolute monarch was law but only Rachasat or kingmade law. The King, however, was to prescribe the law only as it flows out of, and conforms to, the Thammasat or Fundamental Law.

The Modern Fundamental Law is, of course, to be found in the Constitution, in which both authority and liberty are defined in accordance with Western principles. The Constitution is revered by the Thai people, but if it is to have life, it cannot be a mere legal instrument; it must be a living and inspiring spirit.

With the historical background of the spirit of freedom of the Thai people which I have sketched, I am convinced that the institutions of freedom provided for by the Constitution will grow and thrive, especially as they are safeguarded by representative government.

I have dealt with the traditional check of responsibility on power. I have not done so with the restraint of responsibility on the exercise of freedom. The simple reason is that the freedom of expression, such as freedom of the press, is of relatively recent growth, and I might even say that it has been imported into this country.

Overjoyed by the establishment of the democratic regime, the Thai people acclaim their newly acquired liberties. It is

quite natural, too, that the Thai press should wish to write and say whatever it pleases. But it will learn in time that the restraint of responsibility attaches to the exercise of freedom of expression and that what it should write and say is what it sees fit and not what it pleases. The voice of the people is the voice of God. Yes, but a voice is something articulate and modulated with pitch and tone. Otherwise, the sound uttered is mere noise.

VIII

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES

by *President Carlos P. Garcia*

WHILE THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR WAS BEING FOUGHT, the Filipinos were in the midst of a heroic revolutionary struggle to shake off the yoke of colonialism imposed upon us for three and a half centuries. When the Spanish regime here broke down with the victory of Dewey in the Battle of Manila Bay in May, 1898, the Philippine Revolution under the leadership of Aguinaldo saw the hand of destiny offering a golden opportunity for the cause of liberty and on June 12, 1898, we boldly declared independence and established the Philippine Republic. This great national act, however, was ignored in the Spanish-American Treaty of Paris in December of the same year, and this constrained the Filipinos to reassert and reaffirm their independent statehood. Misunderstanding the American intentions, we fought against them for three long bloody years not counting the cost and, in spite of overwhelming odds, did not stop fighting until the Americans pledged the grant of independence—as soon as we were prepared to run a democratic form of government and live a democratic way of life. After these terms were embodied in the famous instructions of President McKinley to the American Civil Commission, we submitted to the American regime for half a century, accepted American tutelage in democratic government and practices, and in the democratic way of

life. Under the dynamic leadership of Osmena and Quezon, and later Quezon and Osmena, young men who were schooled in the heroic ideals of Rizal and the Philippine Revolution, we continued unrelentingly fighting with constitutional means for our independence until it was finally granted us by peaceful petition on July 4, 1946. This American action started a chain of reaction, global in proportion, resulting in the independence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, and the cycle will roll on irresistibly until the last vestiges of colonialism will have vanished from the earth and universal freedom reigns.

During this eventful half century, Filipino and American statesmen, educators, jurists, soldiers, businessmen, scientists, writers, artists and industrialists worked in complete cooperation and understanding to rebuild the Philippine nation on the basis of freedom and democracy and prepare it for its grand day of independence. Unparalleled progress in all aspects of national life was achieved under the inspiration of freedom. During this period the United States fought victoriously two world wars. In the first one, the United States fought "to make the world safe for democracy." We offered the cream of our youth for military service under the American flag. In the second, our country was invaded and Americans and Filipinos heroically fought side by side in defense of country, freedom and democracy under the mingled shadow of the American and Philippine flags. American blood flowed freely in Bataan and Corregidor and other places and mingled with the blood of our own soldiers. We fell under the Japanese occupation for three bloody and frightful years. But our love and loyalty to the United States remained steadfast in those gloomy years. When almost everything was lost to us, home, liberty, hope and happiness, the immortal pledge of the American people through President Roosevelt "that our freedom will be redeemed and our independence estab-

lished and protected" revived the drooping national spirit and galvanized us into a new unity and solidarity to continue fighting for the cause of democracy—the cause of the United States and her allies.

The solemn pledge was fulfilled with historic fidelity. The American forces of liberation, led by the same American commander that commanded the epic stand of Bataan and Corregidor, General MacArthur, smashed its way from Australia, took back Leyte and the rest of the Philippines in a military saga without equal in history. In the hour of victory it restored the Philippines to the Filipinos. Again American blood flowed freely on Philippine soil, not for conquest, not for colonies, but as an oblation to the sacred ideals of freedom and democracy and dignity of man. The miserable situation in which the Philippines found herself after, and because of, the war would have been a valid-looking cause for delaying our independence. But America kept faith with the Filipino people and, strictly in accordance with her pledge, established our independence on July 4, 1946, and through the Bases Agreement of 1947 and the Mutual Defense Pact protected our republic. This deed of mighty America whereby she re-deemed in all good faith and fidelity her plighted word of honor to the Philippine nation will endure forever with the pulsings of eternity.

This is the historical background that lends the perspective through which the fundamental foreign policies of the Philippine Republic should be viewed. When we entered into the Bases Agreement of 1947, the liberation of our country by America from the nights of horror of the Japanese occupation was fresh in the memory of men. When we entered into the Mutual Defense Pact, grateful memories of the granting of independence were in full bloom in our hearts. The awareness of our responsibilities to defend our republic from aggression loomed large against the backdrop of desolation

and devastation wrought by war, throwing into bold relief our defensive lacks. When the republic laid down the first cornerstone of our foreign policy, namely, to maintain and constantly improve our friendly relation with America on the basis of equality and mutuality, we were asking rehabilitation and reconstruction funds and materials, war damage money. loans, grants and financial aids from Uncle Sam, whose response was both prompt and generous.

In recent months, due to certain happenings, there arose a question in the air: "Is anti-American sentiment growing here? Are Philippine-American relations deteriorating?" For some time, there have been complaints that the Philippines, America's most loyal ally, are being taken for granted in the apportionment of American aid to Asian countries, that Philippine sovereignty is being impaired through the Bases Agreement, and that the Philippines, which had definitely decided to identify herself with the free world under American leadership, receives a treatment inferior to that given neutral-countries and even to former enemies.

It must be admitted that for a fleeting season such talks fermented the cause of neutralism in this country. But when the fair-minded American people came to know that these gripes were never inspired by anti-American sentiment, but rather prompted by a sincere desire of her true friends here to see that her position in international politics be invulnerable, when the American people learned that our motive was noble and our purpose was to strengthen and not disrupt our friendly relation, their President sent the second highest official of the land, Vice President Nixon, to the Philippines to inform the Philippine nation on the auspicious occasion of her tenth independence anniversary celebration that the United States has always recognized and will continue recognizing the full sovereignty of the Philippine Republic over the American bases here; that the United States will formally

transfer to the Philippines all titles and claims to the base lands they may have held. And what is more important still, Vice President Nixon has given the pledge of the American government to continue without letup in the effort to remove all causes of misunderstanding between our two countries. Meantime, the American congress approved an appropriation that doubled, nay, tripled U.S. aid to the Philippines. In this noble effort, for this high objective, the Filipinos have a role to play, an obligation to fulfill. We shall honestly and in all good faith contribute to the accomplishment of the task which is no less ours than theirs.

No Filipino who has his heart in the right place will ever doubt the honorable intentions of the United States. She fulfilled her pledge as embodied in the preamble to the Jones Law. She fulfilled her pledge as enacted in the Philippine Independence Act. She redeemed her pledge given by President Roosevelt during the war. She took back the Philippines from the Japanese clutches, and restored our land to us in the hour of victory. She gave us our independence in 1946 and helped us generously in the critical years of national reconstruction and recovery. She is helping us even now with undiminished generosity. She assented to the Laurel-Langley Agreement intended to unfetter our national economy and enable us to become a more effective factor for democracy in the Far East. And now she has again entered into an engagement to remove all causes of misunderstanding between our two countries. In the five thousand years of written history, you will search in vain for a record that will equal or even approximate this magnanimous, magnificent American record.

In the formulation of our foreign policy, the Philippine Republic has realistically taken cognizance of the fact that in this atomic age our nationalism must keep abreast with the swift advance of time. We realize that distance and the vast

expanse of waters no longer bar access to our land. We cannot therefore retreat within ourselves. We cannot live in unconcern of the events and opinion of the world, nor can we escape being affected thereby. We cannot bar from our land the products and ideas from other parts of the world. We can no longer build on the principle of isolationism. More and more, we are convinced that no country in the world today, with the possible exception of one or two, can defend itself alone against aggression. So poor and weak countries like ours have entered into collective defense arrangements like the SEATO, the NATO, the Rio Pact, Bagdad Pact, etc. The deepening reality is that independence is gradually yielding ground to international interdependence. This is equally true in the economic order because, whether we like it or not, economic laws have a global validity irrespective of race, color or creed. Weak nations like ours that lack authority and power in world councils are becoming aware that we must depend upon the conscience of humanity for our protection and salvation. Even so, our nationalism must develop a realistic reorientation, adopt itself to the "*duut-des-facio-ut-facias*" attitude and evolve a practical attunement with the higher interest common to the human race. True Filipinism cannot afford to be anachronistic. It is dynamic. It advances with the expanding frontiers of civilization.

In line with this thinking, besides our membership with the United Nations and the SEATO, we have become a member of the Colombo Plan. We are a signatory to the famous Bandung Declaration of Afro-Asian countries. We are a member of the International Monetary Fund. We covenanted with Spain, France, England, China, Thailand, Turkey, Ecuador, Egypt and Argentina in separate treaties of amity. We have entered into cultural, air and trade agreements with Japan, Indonesia and other countries, and many more arrangements are being negotiated along this line. We have

again become a bosom friend of Spain, which has left here an imperishable legacy. All the Latin-American countries with whom we are bound by cultural ties and a common political ideology have become our steadfast friends.

Such, in a nutshell, is the story of our ever-expanding international relationship. It has closely followed the logic of our national history. It derives its light and life from the deepest and most enduring sentiments and convictions of our national soul.

Our ten years of international relationship as an independent democracy is a record we can be justly proud of. We have learned to value more greatly human freedom and human dignity. We have understood the deeper and vaster meaning and the sublimer hope immanent in that trinity of democracy—equality, liberty and fraternity. We have excavated from the ruins of imperial glory and grandeur confirmation of the cosmic truth that spiritual bonds among nations are more potent and enduring than those of force or interest. We have discovered from the womb of the atom that only love, truth and justice among peoples and nations can be the indestructible foundations of world peace. There are positive signs on the international horizon that at least the free world is earnestly allowing this revelation to guide its diplomacy. In this grand adventure for humanity's self-regeneration, in this great battle for man's reconquest of himself, the Philippine Republic will render its humble contribution. To this high objective we will dedicate ourselves to the fullest measure in the next decade of our independent life.

The So-Called Shift in Our Foreign Policy

I have been asked recently if our increased emphasis upon Asian relations—notably my visit to Japan—was indicative of any significant shift in foreign policy. My answer, of course,

was in the negative. On the contrary, I pointed out, the forging of closer ties with our free Asian neighbors is a specific point of the Administration's foreign policy, a traditional plank of the Nationalista platform, and, in fact, one of the policies endorsed by all shades of domestic political opinion. The late President Magsaysay not only stated it as a major element of his political outlook but gave it further expression in his sympathetic encouragement of the now internationally lauded "Operations Brotherhood," which has brought us so much closer to our sister republic of Vietnam. Unfortunately, however, we have been so preoccupied with our many and vexing domestic problems that we have not been able to do as much as we might have wished to establish more such neighborly ties.

Racially and geographically we are Asian people. If for no other reason, we should be making this effort to reach out for closer cooperation, for better understanding, for the cultural exchange which is the very essence of man's constantly broadening spiritual and intellectual horizons. But today there is added reason for us to make this effort, a reason which lends significance and urgency to the tasks we have assumed.

There is a growing awareness in Asia that the relentless drive of communism for world domination is something that cannot be ignored by any free Asian. Appropriately—or perhaps ironically—the most sobering warning comes from the mainland of Asia itself. There the Chinese Communists proudly announce their communes, a preview of Marxist Utopia—as they themselves describe it to a shocked world. It is the most monstrous and gruesome degradation of a people in modern history. The very bedrock of the Asian way of life—the family—has been shattered by decrees. In its place has been imposed a fantastic, militarized, social system in which men and women, husbands and wives, live in separate barracks and eat in segregated mess halls while their children

are raised in state institutions. Marched off to work and marched back again, their every waking hour is under rigid direction and discipline. No feudal despot, no imperialist conqueror has ever dared attempt as complete an enslavement of a people.

If the impact of this development were only upon our conscience as fellow humans, it would be bad enough. But beyond our compassion for its victims comes realization of the purpose of this social nightmare. Where ancient despots employed slave labor to build monuments to their egos, these slaves of our time are being employed to build a powerful, aggressive state machine intended to subjugate their neighbors, who, indeed, already are wincing under its destructive pressure.

Only recently the Malayan Minister of Commerce attacked Chinese Communist dumping practices in south Asia as naked use of slave labor for economic warfare. It was pointed out that products were being sold for only a fraction of their cost of manufacture and 300 per cent below the mainland selling price. Soviet dumping of tin below its own purchase price to capture traditional markets has also been protested.

Elsewhere, other of our free Asian neighbors are rising to protest veiled economic and political aggressions by the Red bloc. Indonesia's chief delegate to the Afro-Asian conference has challenged the right of the Soviets to speak for the subjugated Moslems of central Asia. Thailand found it necessary to expel two Soviet diplomats for espionage and subversion. In Burma new regulations are being applied to check the economic subversion activities of Communist-controlled banks. Japan just recently experienced a Chinese Communist effort to use trade agreements as a weapon to influence international Japanese politics.

More and more free Asians are coming to realize that the

Communist invitation to peaceful coexistence was an empty propaganda gesture. Each day there is mounting evidence in this part of the world that the Communists' pious endorsement of "*pancha Sila*" does not inhibit them from cynically violating these principles any more than they have hesitated to violate the universally accepted canons of international law.

In Europe a distressed airman who happened to land in Red-controlled territory is shamelessly held hostage for political bargaining. In this hemisphere, even now, we are witnessing the incredibly callous tactic of deadly artillery barges—with their attendant human suffering—launched on alternate days, not for military conquest, mind you, but merely to advance a propaganda line. However reluctantly, therefore, hitherto hopeful Asians have come to accept the grim fact that the Communists have not relaxed their aggressive pressures, that Moscow and Peking leaders meant it when they vowed continued adherence to Leninism—which means the objective of a totally Communist world by fair means or foul—and that they have merely changed their weapons of warfare.

How this change came about is pertinent to our present Asian policy line. It will be recalled that the SEATO came into being as the free world's response in this area to the challenge of naked, Red military aggression against Asian people and states. There have been some arguments as to the actual strength of the SEATO collective security system. While the Chinese Communists have called it a "paper tiger," their ceaseless propaganda efforts to destroy it suggest that it is not a small source of concern. Certainly, whatever the firepower of SEATO may be, its deterrent effectiveness is beyond dispute. The inescapable fact is that Red military aggressions ceased when the SEATO was born, and, in keeping with Leninist doctrine, the Communists shifted to a policy of

attraction, cloaking the tactic of deceit prescribed likewise by Lenin as an orthodox element of Red policy.

Thus, the war goes on. Only the weapons—at least temporarily—have changed. How are we to respond to this challenge? Collective purpose, collective action and a pooling of resources were effective in the military phase. Why should it not be effective in the current situation? We believe that it can be.

It is difficult to say at this time exactly what form collective Asian defense against Communist economic and political aggression should take. An essential precondition of such effort, however, is obvious. Among the members of the free Asian community there must develop a broad and sympathetic understanding of each others' thinking, problems and national objectives. Only with such understanding can we explore the common ground upon which a common economic, political and spiritual defense may be based, and collective action undertaken. To achieve this understanding for ourselves and to encourage our neighbors to seek it is what motivates the current emphasis of our foreign policy.

In pursuing this path we feel that we are fulfilling our own concept of the role of each member of the free world community in its defense. Having reached the conviction that the Communist drive toward world dominion is not a conventional, big-power struggle from which we can stand aloof, it becomes an obligation involving national self-respect not to leave the waging of the battle to others. Our sovereign dignity demands that we make every contribution within our competence to the arsenal of freedom. This is a contribution we can make, and one which, modest though it may be, could mark a turning point in the adverse tide.

We approached our self-imposed task with humility, seeking no role of leadership, offering only the wholesome Filipino concept of the "*barangay*." If we can thereby serve as

catalysts of free Asian unity and cooperation for the preservation of our hard-won freedoms, our share of the victory will be more than ample justification.

But there are other facets, other by-products to this calculated expansion of our foreign relations. If I have stressed its security aspects, its relation to the massive global contest for man's freedom, it is because survival, after all, must be the prime concern of nations as well as individuals. The individual may survive, after a fashion, as a slave, but the vital organs of a nation are its institutions and the nation ceases to exist once those institutions are destroyed.

In our concern for security from external destruction, therefore, we have not ignored the *domestic* requirements for survival—economic expansion and development to meet the expanding needs and expanding expectations of an expanding population. A characteristic of the modern world is the growing interdependence of all its parts. We have seen the enemy's application of a total war strategy in which the assault takes place on all fronts of human activity—military, economic, political and even spiritual. Our response to the challenge must be comparably total. In brief, every element of our domestic society must be strengthened, every member of the free world community must be strengthened, if the community as a whole is to prevail over its foes.

New channels of trade and commerce, the exchange of ideas, the absorption of new experience—all these nutrients of national growth—are part of our Asian quest. Confident of the stability and durability of our traditional foreign relationships, we are now prepared to broaden our horizons, to explore *additional* areas of friendship and cooperation. If this is to be called a shift of policy, it must not be misconstrued as a shift due to indecision. On the contrary, it should be recognized as a shift to a higher plane of natural maturity and national self-confidence.

IX

STAND TOGETHER OR FALL SEPARATELY

by *Tanku Abdul Rahman Putra*

THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE HAS BECOME AN ARENA OF conflict between great powers, a struggle we all know as the "cold war." It is a battle of words and wits, of competition in research and economics in endless rivalry for dominance over the hearts of men, a clash of opposing beliefs on the nature of man and on the shaping of human destiny.

It will be a very sad day, indeed, if in this vital struggle of ideas, and amid this welter of propaganda, the small nations of the world have no voice. We in Malaya—as I am sure you do also in the Philippines—feel most earnestly that it is the privilege and the duty of small countries to speak up in the interests of all men to prevent the cold war from becoming "hot." No man of sense wants the world to blow up in his face because of the flash of sudden anger or the magnification of a minor incident.

Only by persistence, patience and principle can peace be kept in the world, and we should never cease to insist on the paramount importance of peace. War like disease can be contagious, but war like disease can be prevented if the proper precautions are taken.

We in the small nations know that without peace there can be no progress. We know, too, that we do not want to waste our substance in profitless expenditure on arms. And

all of us in Asia know that the wave of liberation which has swept our continent in these stirring years is fundamentally due to a flood of protest in the hearts of millions against inequality and injustice, against domination on account of race and colour.

If the small nations speak up—and speech is the only weapon we have—if we speak up and act constructively, then only can we be sure that all men everywhere will be told of our needs, our fears and our aspirations.

Even if others choose to exert their sense of power, and there are some who exult in doing so, let us, the small nations, set an example and do everything we can to ensure that the world in which we all must live moves only in the orbit of peace and progress. Let others compete for the future of outer space; but for us, let us concentrate on the inner needs of men, whose fate hangs on us.

We in Malaya believe in stability at home and abroad, economically and politically; we believe that peace, security and happiness are essential for all men. This is what we have been trying to do in the brief time of our independence, and that is the path we intend to pursue, speaking up without fear or favour to both friend and foe.

This is the course we have been following, and we are trying to encourage others to join us in pursuing it. There should be far more contacts between the leaders and peoples of Southeast Asia because we live in the same region. In the brief time since I took over office as Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, I have traveled to Vietnam, Thailand, Ceylon and now the Philippines; and just before I became Prime Minister, I visited Indonesia.

In all these places, I have urged that there is a paramount need for us to come together, no matter what our differences of views may be on foreign affairs. This is not a question of

belonging to any bloc, or being against joining blocs, or deciding to chart one's course as one's own. Our mutual interests in economic improvement of our own area rise above these considerations.

What is needed is a new approach, a meeting of minds with the common purpose of looking at Southeast Asia as a whole, a common determination that while one is thinking first of his own country, each of us must also bear in mind the fortunes of our whole region and the betterment of the lot of our peoples.

I hope that my visit here to the Philippines will be the first of a new series of contacts between Asian leaders made in the spirit of what I propose—get together, assess our problems, and seek ways and means of solving them. In my view it is sheer folly to think that we can just sit back and do nothing. If we do not stand together, then we may fall separately.

The Philippines and Malaya have much in common: racial ties, affinity of interests, similarity of political views. If, as a start, we could achieve something together, there is hope that we can win others within our region to our way of thought.

We in Malaya consider that independence and sovereignty imply a duty and responsibility in any nation, whether large or small, that it is no use being a spectator of events, but that we must act together.

I think it is fair to say that for a small nation we have made a good start in helping solve some of the problems which beset the world, and that we have suggested ways and means which can be of lasting benefit to Southeast Asia. I referred earlier to our belief in economic stability. This is of particular importance not only to Malaya but to the whole of Southeast Asia because in our view the only way to combat

infiltration by the Communists is to ensure that the conditions in Southeast Asia are very much better than in fact they are today.

Then communism will have no appeal because there will be nothing it can offer which successful democracy cannot already provide. There is the fact also that all of us need to develop more rounded economies if we are to improve our standard of living.

At the ECAFFE conference held in Kuala Lumpur only ten months ago, I proposed an economic charter for Southeast Asia, a general agreement which would guarantee to investors from overseas security of tenure, and an assured part in the development of natural and essential industries. This is the policy we have adopted in Malaya, and already it has met with a promising response. This is the policy which you are following in the Philippines, and I understand there has been a big influx of investment into this country.

So firmly do I believe that an economic charter as a guarantee for investors is the only sound answer for the future development of Southeast Asia that we in Malaya decided it was necessary to go even further. You all know that our proposal in the United Nations for special studies to be made of all the possibilities of development in all the underdeveloped countries met with resounding approval.

Except for the Communist bloc—who preach a lot about the plight of underdeveloped areas but when it comes to voting are not prepared to do anything about it—the rest of the world welcomes the action we have initiated. I am confident that when the final reports are made to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the result will be a recommendation for an economic charter for all underdeveloped nations.

We in Malaya, too, have faced up to the economic threats of immediate and direct importance. I mean the recent prac-

tices adopted by the Communist bloc, unquestionably as a weapon in the "cold war," of dumping goods on the world markets to upset fair prices both in primary commodities and secondary goods.

We spoke out forcefully against the dumping of tin by the Soviet Union, and we took action recently to ban the import of certain goods from Communist China because these were being supplied far below cost, undermining even the low-cost goods coming into Malaya from such Asian countries as India and Japan.

You may say that this was done in the course of self-interest! Of course it was, but nevertheless, the fact remains that unless this economic aggression was countered, the results throughout the whole of Southeast Asia might well have been chaotic.

But we in Malaya did not stop there. We realized that again, as with the economic charter, it was important to take the larger view. As a result we were among the enthusiastic sponsors of a move in the United Nations to tackle the whole problem of stability in commodity prices everywhere in the interest of all primary-producing countries.

These are examples of what we have been doing recently in Malaya to play our part in making the world a richer and happier place to live in, and those examples provide the basic reason why I have stressed the need for stability, the need to think and act together with a larger view. If we all work for stability, each for our own nation, and each for the whole region of Southeast Asia, then I am confident we can make this area of the world as rich in human betterment as we are already in our natural resources.

OUR LINGERING COLONIAL COMPLEX

by *Claro M. Recto*

OUR NATIONALISM HAS ENTERED INTO ANOTHER PERIOD OF crisis, all the more grave because it is subtle and generally unrecognized.

This crisis does not arise from the growth of internationalism. It comes, if I may put it that way, from the stubborn remnants of binationalism. We are afflicted with divided loyalties. We have not yet recovered from the spell of colonialism.

The flagstuffs that still stand, two by two, in front of our public buildings are the symbols of this psychological phenomenon, this split personality, of our nation. Too many of our peoples, in their heart of hearts, profess allegiance not only to the Republic of the Philippines, whose sun and stars wave alone in this fourth year of our independence, but unconsciously also to the United States of America, whose stars and stripes may have been hauled down in fact but not in spirit, and which, by an optical illusion induced by long habit, are imagined to be still flying from the empty flagpole.

Even the most significant date in our history contrives to strengthen this feeling of unchanged relationship, for, by the terms of an American statute, we cannot even celebrate the rebirth of our republic, without automatically commemorating also the declaration of American independence. For the proc-

lamation of our independence, the anniversary of the first republic would have been a date more in keeping with historic justice, and the anniversary of Rizal's martyrdom, chosen in our Constitution to mark the beginning and the end of presidential and congressional terms of office, would have been recommended by logic and expediency as well as by veneration for our national hero. Not these dates, however, but the greatest official holiday of the United States, their "glorious Fourth," has now become the climax of our own national calendar.

Our peculiar situation has been heightened by the unique circumstances in which we attained our independence. The other liberated Asian nations have been spared the ambiguities under which we labor; they faced issues that were clear-cut; blood and tears, exploitation and subjugation, and centuries of enmity divided the Indonesians from the Dutch, the Indians and the Burmans from the British, the Vietnamese from the French; and their nationalist victories were not diluted by sentiments of gratitude, or by regrets, doubts, and apprehensions.

But an intensive and pervasive cultural colonization, no less than an enlightened policy of gradually increasing autonomy, dissolved whatever hatreds and resentments were distilled in the Filipino-American war; by the time of the enactment of the Jones Law, promising independence upon the establishment of a stable government, an era of goodwill was firmly opened, which even the cabinet crisis under Governor General Wood could only momentarily disturb. A system of temporary trade preferences, under which our principal industries were developed, cemented the relationship with the hard necessities of economic survival; for it was belatedly realized that the same system of so-called free trade had made us completely dependent on the American market. The vicissitudes and triumphs of the common struggle against the Japanese Empire completed the extraordinary structure, and

it was not at all strange or unexpected that when our independence was finally proclaimed, it was not so much an act of separation as one of "more perfect union."

Great numbers of Filipinos, therefore, pride themselves in professing fealty to America even without the rights of Americans. Their gaze is fixed steadily and unwaveringly on the great North American Republic, which is to them the alpha and the omega of human progress and political wisdom.

Great expectations may lead to disillusionments just as great; the experiences of both Filipinos and Americans in the last war when the promised aid upon which such fanatical faith was placed did not come, and after liberation when the exaggerated hopes for total rehabilitation and vast benefits, bonuses, and pensions were disappointed have already suggested the extent of the danger.

The habit of continuously and importunely soliciting American assistance, and of running to the seemingly inexhaustible treasury in Washington whenever faced with financial difficulties has only fostered a thoughtless and irresponsible prodigality, which has already been condemned by the most responsible among the Filipinos and the Americans, and led to the preaching of the new gospel of self-reliance and self-help.

But sometimes I fear that the nature of the problem that is inherent in our relations with the United States is not thoroughly understood, and that the responsibility for its solution is not equitably shared.

For the problem is not ours alone. What is for us a problem of independence and self-respect is for the Americans a problem of true and enlightened leadership. For them, the Philippines constitute a test of the great mandate which destiny has thrust upon them as the acknowledged leaders of the Western democratic system.

Here, under the most favorable circumstances, with a

people perfectly conditioned by half a century of indoctrination to accept their guidance and assistance, the Americans are expected to prove that their patented way of life can be practiced by an Asian nation. Here, in a client republic committed to their cause, they are expected to show that they can resist the temptations of unchallenged power, and that they can be trusted to be mindful of the rights of the weak as much as they must respect the rights of the strong.

The Americans will judge for themselves how they can best meet this challenge. Surely they themselves must realize that a spoon-fed capitalist democracy unable to survive outside the colonial incubator except through artificial respiration and periodic injections of borrowed dollars will not strike the other peoples of Asia as a model to be followed.

The interests of the United States in the Philippines and in Asia would best be served by the establishment here of a truly independent government that could stand on its own feet without the need of continual American assistance, relying on our own resources and on the support of our own united people.

Yet it seems that there are not lacking Americans who allow themselves to be blinded by systematic flattery, and who believe, on the one hand, that any Filipino who calls himself a brother American is automatically a good Filipino, and, on the other hand, that any Filipino who is not un-questioningly pro-American is, *ipso facto*, hopelessly anti-American.

These Americans do not seem to recognize the fact that it is possible for a Filipino to place the interests of his own country over and above even the interests of the United States without necessarily being actuated by hostile motivations.

No one needs to be reminded of this fundamental postulate of any nationalism. Unfortunately, those who still live in

the memories of the heyday of imperialism in the unincorporated territory of the Philippine Islands think that the United States should expect or demand the same unceasing chorus of unanimous flattery that is raised by the satellites and protectorates of the Kremlin. They are on the verge of the psychopathic state that has found its Soviet expression in purges and public confessions when they look upon every criticism of American policy and every display of Filipino nationalism as a dangerous deviation from the democratic line, to be labelled as pro-Communist or anti-American just as similar deviations are branded in Russia as Titoism, Trotskyism, fascism, or imperialism.

What these frustrated imperialists fail to realize is that if America stands for anything, it is for the self-determination of peoples, for self-reliance and self-respect, and for the equality of races and of nations, and that if America needs friends here, she needs friends, above all, who will have the courage to point to the mistakes and shortcomings in our mutual relations, and to suggest formulas for their improvement.

Indeed, the most searching test of American policy in the world today is whether the United States in their quest for security will follow for the sake of expediency the shortsighted and fatal course of supporting reaction and putting up puppets who are without will to resist alien dictation or authority to command the allegiance of their own people; or whether, in the true, legitimate tradition of their great republic, they will take the harder but nobler and ultimately safer course of encouraging and respecting genuine governments truly representative of their peoples, whose just demands, although they may perhaps result in temporary inconvenience, are the best measure and test of their legitimacy and democratic character.

Yet the crisis of our nationalism is created by the fact that many of our countrymen have assiduously cultivated a

servile mentality, and no less than many Americans, they, too, have identified pro-Americanism with patriotism. They resent criticisms of American policy in the Philippines as if it were our own, and, on the other hand, they regard the most deserved condemnations of their own incompetence and dishonesty as if they were somehow indirect attacks upon the United States.

We have become engaged in a great national contest of pro-Americanism, to the extent that a tradition is being built up that a candidate for the chief magistracy of this sovereign republic must somehow or other, if he is to insure his victory, secure the blessing of the White House and the support of the local American community as if we were some Soviet satellite whose prime minister is named by the Russian Ambassador and the local Communist party. Every day on every hand, we find many of our own people in the highest places obsessed by the question of what the Americans will think or say about this or do about that, as if American interests and American public opinion were the only things that mattered, and the only standards to be followed in the management of our own affairs.

It is in this field that the press can still serve the cause of nationalism in the spirit of its heroic predecessors. Let us rid ourselves of this insidious servility that does no good, and gives no credit, either to the Philippines or to the United States.

We are not Americans, and those of us who pretend to be Americans risk only the ridicule and laughter of their so-called brothers behind their backs. We could not in fact become Americans, even if we wanted to, to the discomfiture of some of our countrymen; and I suggest therefore that we cease thinking of ourselves as some sort of secondhand citizens of the United States.

There are fundamental factors of race, geography, culture,

and tradition which cannot be legislated or negotiated out of existence, and the gulf that sets apart our nation from all others, including the Americans, may not be bridged even with dollars, Hollywood pictures, and borrowed political institutions. It is a gross mistake to believe that Filipino nationalism is now completely tamed; there is no doubt in my mind that the masses of our people, given the opportunity to decide, will give the same nationalist verdict which they have always given in our long political history, from the repudiation of the *Federates*, who believed in our annexation to the United States as the *summum bonum* for our country, and the defeat of the *Democrats* in 1922, as the alleged pro-American friends and supporters of Governor General Wood, down to the full vindication in the national poll of 1946 of those who served in the occupation government to protect the people from the rigors of enemy occupation, and insure their survival, even at the risk of being accused of disloyalty to the United States.

Our nationalism cannot be written off, and we should not lose faith in the independence we proclaimed five years ago.

It may be that the future of world democracy calls for an ever increasing measure of international cooperation and organization for which each and every nation, without exception, must contribute a portion of each sovereignty on a basis of equality as condition *sine qua non*. Our nationalism, as I have already said, is not incompatible with this sound internationalism. But no sane or true internationalism calls for the subordination of our vital national interests. Internationalism is not just another name for imperialism, and it cannot justify our willing reversion to the status of a colony.

Our flag flies alone in our skies, and we call ourselves a sovereign republic, whose achievements it is proposed to recount before the world. But achievements accomplished through the grudging bounty of another state, temporary

prosperity attained with borrowed money, are achievements which are neither permanent, nor legitimate, nor truly our own.

Only when we rise from the knees we have bent in beggary, and stand beside the other nations of the world, not on crutches but on our own feet, thinking and speaking and acting as free men and as free citizens of a true republic, in name and in fact, with undivided loyalties to our own sovereign nation and people, and under a legitimate regime dispensing justice and promoting the general welfare, then and only then can we rightly claim to have achieved and deserved our independence, and have cause to indulge in a national celebration of the glorious resurrection of our freedom after the long and mournful season of its betrayal, passion, and crucifixion.

14 OCT 1983